“Without information and telecommunication, people don’t know where to go for safety,” the ICRC reported from an ongoing armed conflict. Another humanitarian worker recalled that when connectivity is down and “a bombing happens, especially in the night, you cannot reach ambulances”. The importance of connectivity for people affected by armed conflict is further exemplified when displaced people ask humanitarian organizations for Wi-Fi or a ‘hot spot’, as connectivity provides the most direct contact to their loved ones. Yet, disruptions of connectivity are frequent in today’s armed conflict, at times part of incidental damage caused by hostilities, at other times presented as a measure necessary to impact an enemy’s operations.

In this post, ICRC Legal Adviser Tilman Rodenhäuser discusses some of the limits that international humanitarian law (IHL) imposes on connectivity disruptions in armed conflict. The notion ‘connectivity disruptions’ is used to describe operations by belligerents that make digital connectivity or tele-communications unavailable or otherwise disrupted, temporarily or in the longer term.

Information and communication technologies (ICTs) have become an integral part of life in many parts of the world. In October 2024, states and the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement recognized the importance of access to ICTs for the delivery of  “goods and services, including medical services for the civilian population, for humanitarian operations, for civilians to seek and receive information in an accessible format about where to find safety and objects essential for their survival, and for maintaining or restoring family links, including in situations of armed conflict” (PP2).

For years, human rights experts and civil society have called out the “dramatic real-life effects of shutdowns on the lives and human rights of millions of people”, and have emphasized the rise of “shutdowns” imposed in countries affected by armed conflict. Indeed, connectivity disruptions risk violating national and international law; however, despite their significant impact on people, connectivity disruptions during armed conflict are not always unlawful. Assessing the lawfulness of connectivity disruptions during armed conflict requires analysis of a state’s human rights and other public international law obligations, as well as belligerents’ obligations under IHL. This post explores primarily the limits that IHL imposes.

IHL limits on connectivity disruptions during armed conflict

For an assessment of connectivity disruptions under IHL, it is helpful to differentiate between two situations. On the one hand, infrastructure on which connectivity depends is often disrupted, damaged or destroyed in the context of hostilities. This could be, for example, the bombing of enemy communication infrastructure, attacks that damage such infrastructure incidentally, or the disruption of connectivity through cyber or electromagnetic operations.

On the other hand, connectivity disruptions can be caused by a belligerent imposing measures on infrastructure or service providers. This could be, for instance, a government ordering a national telecommunication provider, or a private company, to disable connectivity in a territory where fighting takes place, or in a territory controlled by a non-state armed group.

IHL limits on the conduct of hostilities that result in connectivity disruptions

When assessing the lawfulness of connectivity disruptions under the IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities, the cardinal principle of distinction requires that belligerents at all times distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives. With the exception of military communication networks, communication infrastructure is generally civilian in nature. In certain situations, however, pieces of civilian communication infrastructure can qualify as military objectives under IHL. This would only be the case if the piece of infrastructure makes, by its nature, use or purpose, “an effective contribution to military action” and its “total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at the time, offer a definite military advantage”.

Such an assessment must be done with caution. For example, the interconnected infrastructure that constitutes the internet as a whole – whether globally or nationally – is unlikely to qualify as a military objective. Instead, belligerents must identify which piece of internet infrastructure makes an effective contribution to military actions. In addition, the destruction or neutralization of a piece of infrastructure is only lawful if that act offers a definite military advantage. As militaries will often use several communication channels to avoid a single point of failure, it may be questioned what military advantage can actually be achieved by destroying civilian communication infrastructure used by the adversary.

Even if certain pieces of communication infrastructure constitutes a military objective, the attacker must still comply with other rules on the conduct of hostilities, in particular proportionality and precautions in attack. In these assessments, particular attention must be given to:

• the length of a disruption (including how easily connectivity can be restored);
• the scope (for example, all electronic communication, or only one form used by the military while leaving alternative communication channels for civilians operational);
• the geographic reach of the disruption (for example, a specific part of a city or town where hostilities take place, or an entire region);
• and its impact on civilian life (for instance, whether the operation of civilian critical infrastructure is affected, the harm this causes to civilians, or whether connectivity of the control systems of dams, dykes and nuclear electrical generating stations may be affected and dangerous forces risk being released).

In addition, belligerents must consider whether there are means or method of warfare that are feasible to use and may achieve their objective while avoiding or minimizing civilian harm. In some circumstances, this can mean that disrupting connectivity through cyber or electromagnetic operations must be preferred over physical destruction.

Which military operations to disrupt connectivity amount to “attacks” under IHL?

Most of the rules stemming from the principles of distinction, proportionality and precautions apply to military operations that amount to an attack under IHL.

IHL defines the notion of attack as an “act of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence”. An operation that physically destroys communication infrastructure which is not under the physical control of the attacking party – such as bombing a communication tower – certainly qualifies as an “attack”. In contrast, different views exist – among states and experts – about which kind of cyber operations so qualify, such as a wiper malware that disables a cellphone provider, or a distributed denial of service (DDoS) operation that makes an internet service provider unavailable. A growing number of states, and also the ICRC, have taken the view that the disabling of an object (e.g. the ICT infrastructure of an internet service provider) through a cyber operation would amount to an attack under IHL.

Even if the view is taken that certain operations that cause a connectivity disruption do not amount to an attack and must therefore not comply with all IHL rules on the conduct of hostilities, several IHL rules and principles must nonetheless be respected. This includes, in particular, the IHL principle of necessity, the principle of distinction as reflected in Article 48 of Additional Protocol I, and the obligation to take constant care to spare the civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. Thus, disrupting connectivity solely to harm civilian populations cannot be justified under IHL. In addition, belligerents much consider the specific protection that IHL provides for the medical mission and humanitarian operations, as discussed below. Likewise, connectivity disruptions must not be used to render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian populations, for instance by disabling their remote operation or maintenance in situations in which physical access is not possible.

Protecting life-saving information, family life, medical services, and humanitarian operations

Additional IHL rules must be considered in the context of connectivity disruptions, both in the conduct of hostilities and, in particular, when a belligerent imposes connectivity disruptions on territory under its own control. Furthermore, states must respect obligations under human rights law, as applicable.

Four issues shall be briefly discussed here, while recognizing that additional legal issues will arise and each of them deserves further analysis.

First, access to life-saving information

Receiving digital information about incoming attacks, or finding recommended evacuation routes, may depend on connectivity and can be life-saving. Under IHL, maintaining connectivity and peoples’ ability to seek and receive information may be necessary for an attacker to ensure that precautions such as advanced warnings – if sent electronically – are effective. Likewise, maintaining connectivity can also be critical for authorities to implement precautions against the effects of attacks, for instance to quickly remove civilians from the vicinity of military objectives, and to share information on how to protect themselves against the dangers resulting from military operations.

In addition, the ability to seek and receive information is protected by the right to freedom of expression under human rights law, such as the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. While governments may derogate from or restrict that right, human rights law sets strict conditions for such a measure, in particular the requirements of legality, necessity, and proportionality. These requirements must be interpreted restrictively. In the context of connectivity disruptions, for example, the Human Rights Committee as well as other experts and regional courts have expressed concern that too often the legal basis for such restriction is unstated or vague, and restrictions risk having disproportionate impact on the rights of people. In the extreme, in times of armed conflict connectivity disruptions risk impacting the right to life, which the Human Rights Committee has concluded includes the entitlement “to be free from acts and omissions that […] may be expected to cause [peoples’] unnatural or premature death”.

Second, the right to family life

When hostilities rage, families are often desperate for news from loved ones. IHL sets out an obligation for all parties to armed conflicts to respect family life as far as possible. This means, among other things, that the exchange of strictly personal news between family members shall be enabled, and information on the fate and whereabouts of missing family members be provided. Thus, parties to armed conflict may not impose disruptions for the purpose of disrupting family correspondence, and communication must be maintained as far as possible to enable communication between family members. If communication is disrupted for any reason, a minimum of family correspondence must (within the context of an international armed conflict) or should (within the context of a non-international armed conflict) be enabled through a neutral intermediary, such as the ICRC, its Central Tracing Agency and National Societies.

Such measures may also be required under the human right to family life.

Third, respecting and protecting the medical mission

Being able to call medical services, and enabling communication among them, is often indispensable to enable medical evacuations. Yet, if communication networks are down, emergency services cannot be reached. Likewise, connectivity is essential for access to patient data stored online, or telemedicine, and thus important to provide the wounded and sick with the medical care they require.

IHL contains several rules on the protection of the medical mission in armed conflict. These rules include that parties to armed conflict “must, without delay, take all possible measures to search for, collect and evacuate the wounded [and] sick’,^[1] and ‘medical units exclusively assigned to medical purposes must be respected and protected in all circumstances”.^[2]

Thus, connectivity disruptions must not be directed against communication systems dedicated to medical missions. In addition, and as further described below, concrete measures need to be taken to facilitate the work of medical services.

This conclusion is also supported by human rights law, as applicable, which at the very least prohibits governments from directly or indirectly interfering with the right to health. Human rights experts have also demanded that where security measures, such as road blocks, incidentally impose disruptions on access to health care, such disruptions must be “legitimate and essential”, and exceptions for access to health facilities, goods and services provided.

Four, respecting and protecting humanitarian operations

At the ICRC, we frequently experience the impact of connectivity disruptions on humanitarian operations. Connectivity is today an integral part of humanitarian services, such as mobile cash assistance and the restoration of family links. When operating in a war zone, communication between humanitarian personnel, access to navigation systems, and communication with the belligerents is also indispensable to operate safely.

During armed conflict, parties must respect and protect humanitarian personnel, which entails refraining from attacking them or unduly interfering with their work (see here). In addition, parties to armed conflict must “allow and facilitate rapid and unimpeded passage of humanitarian relief for civilians in need […] subject to their right of control”. Thus, imposing disruptions aimed at hindering the work of humanitarian organizations would be unlawful.

In many situations, medical and humanitarian operations may not be the direct target of connectivity disruptions; yet, their operations are incidentally affected. In these situations, and in line with the above-described obligations under IHL and human rights law, parties to armed conflict must take feasible measures to avoid or at least minimize the impact on medical and humanitarian operations. This may include, for example, that authorities should permit medical missions and impartial humanitarian organizations to use multiple communication solutions to continue carrying out their humanitarian functions, including satellite communication as a backup. In addition, if parties to armed conflict restrict connectivity for reasons of military necessity and thereby affect humanitarian or medical operations (just as the movement of humanitarian personnel may be temporarily restricted in cases of imperative military necessity), such disruptions should only be of a scale and duration that is necessary for specific military operations.

***

The more connectivity becomes essential in the lives of people affected by armed conflict, the harsher the consequences of connectivity disruptions. Attacking military communication lines has long been part of warfare, and neither IHL nor human rights law prohibits connectivity disruptions explicitly or in all circumstances. Yet, as seen in this post, if belligerents consider attacking communication infrastructure, or otherwise disabling connectivity, they must consider several IHL and human right law obligations, as applicable, and take practical measures to safeguard civilian life and family contact, as well as medical and humanitarian operations.

References

[1] AP I, Art. 10 and AP II, Art. 7 (parallel to GC I, Art. 12; GC II, Art. 13; GCIV, Art. 16); AP II, Art. 8 (parallel to GC I, Art. 15); CIHL Rule 109.. See also GC I-IV, Art. 3(2).

[2] GC I, Art. 19; GC IV, Art. 18; AP I, Art. 12; APII, Art. 11. ICRC Customary IHL Study, Rule 28.

See also:

• Cléa Thouin, Offline and in danger: the humanitarian consequences of connectivity disruptions, July 1, 2025.
• Joelle Rizk, Why is the ICRC concerned by ‘harmful information’ in war?, September 10, 2024.
• Chris Brew, From content to harm: how harmful information contributes to civilian harm, February 27, 2024.
• Susanna Acland and Barnaby Willitts-King, Mobile phones for participation: building responsible public-private humanitarian partnerships, December 7, 2023.
• Rakesh Bharania and Mark Silverman, Protective by design: safely delivering connectivity as aid, July 8, 2021.